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Tax is one of the forms that government distributes social residual product, 
which has character of compulsoriness, voluntaries and certainty. To taxpayer, tax is 
the cost that he must pay, less tax expense equals to more net profit. Under the 
condition of certain revenue, cost and expense, net profit will increase or decrease 
with amount of tax payment. With the improvement and intensification of tax 
administration and severe penalty to the tax dodging, taxpayer will take the 
consequences of penalty and crack his credit if he or she reduces the tax by illegal 
way. So, it is the best choice for taxpayer to manage manufacture and financing 
activities to reduce the tax burden by tax planning. 
In the paper, I make use of games theory to analyze the tax planning, and the 
main contents are as follows: 
1. In the paper, I describe the basic conception of tax planning, specify the 
definition of tax planning，compare tax planning with tax evasion and tax avoidance，
point out the theory foundation of tax planning and introduce the games theory to 
analyses the players，information，strategies and order of play in tax planning. 
2. According to the economic effect of tax planning between taxpayers，I points 
out if there is no other way to reduce tax burden，tax planning is the best strategy，and 
build the games model of tax planning and tax evasion, works out the equilibrium 
solution of the model under different condition，and analyses the factors which affects 
tax planning on aspects of tax administration and taxpayer.  
3. I analyze the game of tax planning between taxpayer and tax authority，point 
out if tax authority believes that the legal probability(β) of tax planning is big or the 
probability of being penalty (λ) is small，（planning，no checking）is the equilibrium 
solution. When β is small or λ is big，there is no pure strategies of Nash equilibrium. I 
analyse the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium，work out the best condition that 
taxpayers make tax planning and the tax authority carries on the tax check, and 















planning，mistake of the tax administration and the ability of taxpayer. 
4. Introducing tax agent， I analyzes principal-agent relationship between 
taxpayer and tax agent，and gain the optimized action of tax agent and the optimized 
incentive coefficient of taxpayer, and point out risk avoidance coefficient of tax agent 
is inverse proportion with incentive coefficient, incentive coefficient is 0.5 for risk 
neutral principal-agent, absolute value of risk avoidance coefficient of risk-preference 
tax agent is in direct ratio with incentive coefficient of taxpayer. 
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到真正节税的目的（Lars Fallan，1995；H.Roland Weistrofler，Rahu Singh 和 Blue 
E.Wooldridge，1999）。 
分析跨国公司如何对不同国家的税收政策做出响应，来激发他们对收入转移
（Klassen 等，1993；Harris，1993；Collins 等，1997）、转让定价（Grubert 等，
1993；Collins 等，1997）、出口退税（Hines 和 Hubbard，1990；Altshuler 和 Newlon，
                                                        










































                                                        














































































    本文的研究主要分为四个部分： 
第一部分：第 1 章。 
该部分介绍了研究的目的，国内外的研究现状、内容和方法，本文的研究思
路，本文的创新和不足。 






























得出了税务代理的 优行动和纳税人对税务代理的 优激励系数。 
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